Abstract-Various public key encryption systems have been proposed in modern information techology. Some of them have also been used in various applications, such as E-commerce and mobile database. This paper proposes two secure receiptororiented encryption systems. The decryptioner's private keys could be changed with the different time periods. This case would be very useful in some practical scenarios, for instance, in a mobile database environment. Besides the semantic security, the proposed schemes have the backward-and-future security, a new security requirement for semantically secure encryption schemes. In terms of construction, the two schemes are based on the pairings over elliptic curves. Also, this paper provides a heuristic security analysis for the underlying system.
I. INTRODUCTION Various public key encryption systems have been proposed in modern information techology. Some of them have also been used in various applications, such as E-commerce and mobile database. Semantic security is one of the security requirements for a secure cryptosystem. Generally speaking, semantic security means that: the view of the ciphertext gives no additional information about the plaintext. Galindo et al proposed these two schemes [1] , [2] in 2003, which are based on elliptic curves. Both of them present semantic security. And they only use the single coordinate of any point over elliptic curves. In contrast to the two schemes, our new schemes use the whole point on the elliptic curves and bilinear pairings to take part in calculations. In addition, our semantically secure encryption scheme is a new type of cryptosystems, since it provides a new security requirement, i.e. backward-and-future security.
Bilinear pairings modified from Weil or Tate pairings [3] are becoming one of new active research topics in information security. Especially, the supersingular curves are the main object used by the bilinear pairings. However, prior to [2] , [4] , [9] , the supersingular curves were undesirable in cryptographic settings since Weil pairing can reduce the discrete logarithm problems in supersingular curves to that in an extension of the underlying finite field. Thanks to Joux [4] and Boneh et al [2] , the pairings have become desirable and applied to various cryptographic primitives: public key encryption [2] , digital signature [5] , key agreement [4] ; and signcryptions [6] . In our paper, we propose several new public key encryption schemes V. Potdar School of Information Systems Curtin University of Technology different from [2] . And the new constructions are motivated by some techniques from [7] , [1] , [9] .
The main contributions of our paper are:
. A new type of semantically secure public key encryption schemes are proposed in this paper. That is, it combines the encryptioner's both public key and private keys with the decryptioner's public keys in encryption algorithms. . The backward-and-future security is introduced into the semantic secure cyrptosytems. Since in some cases, one part of private keys may be compromised by some attackers, so backward-and-future security will solve these circumstances. . Various semantically secure encryption schemes are proposed over elliptic curves, which are based on Pairings. And this will provide more choices in public key cryptosystems. The organization of the rest of our paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the definition of receiptor-oriented encryption scheme and the corresponding requirements on the receiptororiented encryption schemes. Section 3 presents some preliminaries for the new proposed schemes. The constructions on the new cryptosystems are presented in section 4 . The security analysis and the efficiency analysis stay in section 5 and section 6, respectively. And section 7 concludes this paper.
II. DEFINITIONS OF RECEIPTOR-ORIENTED ENCRYPTIONS
In this section, the model of the receiptor-oriented encryption scheme is presented as follows.
Definition 1 (Receiptor-Oriented Encryptions) A receiptor-oriented encryption (abbr. ROE) scheme is a public key cryptosystem comprised of the following three procedures, and in which two entities (encryptioner and decryptioner) are involved:
(1) Key Generation: On input a security parameter X, this probabilistic algorithm returns the long-term public keys and private keys for the encriptioner (pk2, sk2) and the decriptioner (pkl, skl), respectively. Simultaneously, this algorithm also outputs a pair of specified time-stage(ti) public key pkti and private key skt, for the oriented receiptor, i.e. the decryptioner. The initialized time-stage is to. Therefore, the initial time-stage public key and private key for the 0-7803-9094-6/05/$20.00 ©2005 IEEE decryptioner are pkt, and skt., respectively.
(2) Encryption: This is a probabilistic algorithm carried by the encryptioner. Given a plaintext m, the encryptioner will encrypt m by use of its own long-term public key pk2 and private key sk2. During the encrypting, the encryptioner will also use the oriented receiptor's (i.e. decryptioner's) specified time-stage public key pkt, and long-term public key pkl. In addition, some random elements chosen by the encryptioner will be involved. In the end, the encryptioner publishes the ciphertext C (of plaintext m) on its homepage. Furthermore, its homepage will be renewed in time.
(4) Decryption: This is an algorithm done by the decryptioner. The algorithm inputs the ciphertext C, the decryptioner's long-term public key pk1 and private key skl, its specified time-stage public key pkt, and private key skt* as well as the encryptioner's public key pk2. In the end, the plaintext m will be returned.
Definition 2 (Requirements of a Secure ROE Scheme) A secure receiptor oriented public key encryption scheme must satisfy at least the following three requirements.
( In this paper, we choose e as the security parameter for all the proposed receiptor-oriented encryption schemes. Let q be a large prime, and Zq be Zq\{O}. Fq denotes a finite field with q elements. e denotes the bit-wise XOR calculation. Let n be a positive integer with n = 0(f). Let H1 and H2 be two cryptographic hash functions: H1 : G2 -+ {o, l}ln, and H2: G1 x G1 -÷ Z*; where H1 is a universal one-way hash function [8] . G1 and G2 will be given later. * the bit length of p is t; and f may be equal to or larger than 160 for security reason.
IV. RECEIPTOR-ORIENTED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES In this section, we will propose two receiptor-oriented encryption schemes. Both of these schemes are constructed over elliptic curves described in section 3.1. And we develop the constructions motivated by some techniques from [9] , [1] , [7] . In detail, we will propose two non-identity receiptororiented encryption schemes. That is, we will only use the elliptic curve settings to construct the ROE schemes. This kind of ROE schemes does not involve the fully contracted obsession, i.e. there needs no key generation centre.
A. non-Identity based ROE Scheme I By the definition of the ROE scheme, the non-identity based receiptor-oriented encryption scheme 1 has still three algorithms: (1) 
Decryption This is a deterministic algorithm, apart from tion scheme to manage their own public key and private key, ciphertexts, which inputs the decryptioner's public key and respectively. private key, as well as her specified time-stage public and private key. In addition, the encryptioner's public key will also V. SECURITY ANALYSIS be inputted.
In this section, we will deal with some security analyses * the decryptioner first calculates on these ROE schemes by the definition of receiptor-oriented encryption scheme. We will prove that the two non-identity d= e(ci+H2(ci, uP)uP, uP+H2(vP, ci)ci)v+H2(vP sP)'lmeqschemes both have the soundness, semantic security, * she calculates d2 = H1 (di).
. she recovers the corresponding plaintext m by m = d2 D f4-If the ciphertext {fi, f4} is invalid, then she will output nothing U. In the above scheme, there are one pairing evaluation and an modular exponentiation in both encryption and decryption algorithms.
B. Non-ID-based ROE Scheme 2
The non-identity based ROE scheme 2 has the following three algorithms: Key generation, Encryption, and Decryption algorithms.
(1) Key Generation This is a polynomiallly probabilistic algorithm, which returns the domain parameters: a security parameter e ; two groups G1 and G2 with the same order q, and the former is an additive group, and the latter is a multiplicative group; a bilinear pairing e(*, *) : G1 x G1 -* G2; a generator P E G1, and therefore e(P, P) e G2 is a generator of G2; a universal collision-free one-way hash function H () : G2 {0, 1}1n, where n = Q(F). At the end of this algorithm, the encryptioner obtains his long-term public key 3P e G1 and private key ,3 E Z.*; Besides obtaining her long-term public key aP E G1 and private key a E Z,* the decryptioner also obtains a pair of specified time-stage public key pP e G1 and private key p E Zq, respectively.
(2) Encryption This algorithm is dealt with by the encryptioner in probabilistic polynomial time. For any plaintext m e M = f0, i}n, the following procedures will be done: * the encryptioner first chooses uniformly and randomly an elelment r E Zq, and calculates fi = rP E G1.
* he then calculates by use of pairing e(*, *) f2 = e(aP,fi)le(,3P, pP)r, and as well f3 = H1(f2). * In the end, he returns the corresponding ciphertext (f1,f4) by f4 =mef3. (3) Decryption This is a deterministic algorithm carried out by the decryptioner (i.e. the oriented receiptor). Given a ciphtext (fi, f4), she will do. * the decryptioner first calculates an elelment d, = e(fi,/3P)ae(13P,fi)P E G2, and d2 = Hi(dj) E {o, 1In.
* she recovers the corresponding plaintext m by m = d2 EDf4-Remark: In the above two non-identity based receiptororiented encryption schemes, the encryptioner and the decryptoiner may make use of some key distribution technique [9] , and backward-and-future security.
A. Soundness
The soundness of the receiptor-oriented encryption schemes is that: if the encryptioner correctly calculates the ciphertexts according to the descriptions of encryption algorithm, and if the decryptioner correctly carries on the decryption algorithm, then the latter will surely recover the corresponding plaintexts. where X and Y are two random elements belonging to G, and G2, respectively. Proof. Notice that, By the descriptions on encryption algorithms of the identity-based receiptor-oriented encryption scheme 1 in section 4, and without loss of generality, we may let fi = (P f2 = e((Q1,PKGC)e(S2, pkt) (mod q) f3= IHI (fh) f = f3 EDm. where ( E Zq is an unknown (with respect to A) random element; pkt, and Qi are the decryptioner's specified timestage public key and long-term public key, respectively. m is any plaintext in {0, 1}'. PKGC is the domain public parameter.
Since ( is a random element in Zq, fi = (P is a random element in GI. In addition, c2 is also random in G2 since e(*, *) is a bilinear map from G1 x G1 to G2. Therefore, by the definition of universal collision-free one-way hash function [8] , we know that f4 = f3 E m is a random element in G2. What's more, the attacker A does not know the value of C C Zq and S2 E G1. Hence, from the point of view of the attacker A, {fi, f4l is a random pair in G1 x G2. Therefore, the probability of attacker A tells {f,, f4} from {X, Y} is approximately l/q2.
According to the above analysis, any probabilistic polynomial time attacker A will distinguish between {f,, f4} and {X, Y} only with negligible probability.
C. Backward-and-future Security The backward-and-future security is formalized with respect to the oriented receiptor while its specified time-stage private skti is compromised by a probabilistic polynomial time attcker where 7 is a random element; and the compromised private key by attacker A is skt, = v. Now we will prove the probabilistic polynomial time attacker A will not be able to:
(1) figure out the corresponding plaintext m of {fi i f4}; (2) [2] . By this definition, we can use some compression technique applying to the cipher text {f,, f4} (of message m) to get its length equal to f4 [81.
Therefore, the expansion factor of all our new schemes is 1, and at most 2.
In terms of encryption algorithms, the dominated computation is the bilinear pairing evaluation. The encryption for non-identity based ROE scheme 2 need two bilinear pairing evaluations, and one of them can be precomputed. While nonidentity based ROE scheme 1 only need one pairing evaluation. Because of the symmetric construction of the encryption and decryption algorithms, so they have the same computation workloads.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed two non-identity based receiptororiented encryption schemes respectively. In contrast to previous encryption schemes with semantic security, the new schemes make use of both the public and private key of encrytioner and the public keys of decryptioner. This case may be very useful in some practical scenarios. Besides the semantics security the proposed schemes have the backward-and-future security, a new security requirement for semantically secure encryption schemes. As a research topic, it is interesting to analyze the security against chosen cipher-text attack on the proposed schemes.
